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COMMENT

WORK, PLAY, TWEET: PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
REGULATION OF EMPLOYED
STUDENT-ATHLETE SOCIAL MEDIA USE*
DARIUS LOVE**

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the official formation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) in 1910, member-schools and student-athletes have experienced
extraordinary success on and off the courts.1 The athletic prowess of
student-athletes has enabled their respective colleges and universities to attain
elusive national championships and unprecedented amounts of revenue derived
from national sponsorship and media deals.2 However, as many student-athletes
have come to discover, everything that glitters does not always lead to
championship gold. Recently, student-athletes around the nation have raised
multiple concerns surrounding their legal rights.3 Most of the legal unrest found

* This Comment was a co-winner of the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University
Law School’s 2015 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition.
** J.D., Marquette University Law School, 2016; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2012. National Sports Law Institute Sports Law Certificate recipient and 2015-16 Comment Editor of
the Marquette Sports Law Review. Darius would like to thank his family and fellow editors for
providing support and feedback throughout this process. He would also like to extend his gratitude to
Professors Paul Anderson and Paul Secunda, who inspired him to unite his interests in sports law and
labor and employment law to produce this Comment.
1. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12–21 (2000); NCAA Tournament:
5 Best “Cinderella” Runs, CBS L.A. (Mar. 14, 2015), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2015/03/14/ncaatournament-5-best-cinderella-runs/; Daniel D. Zillmer, The 50 Greatest College Football Programs
All-Time Statistically Ranked, FANSIDED, http://fansided.com/2014/10/18/50-greatest-college-footballprograms-time-statistically-ranked/ (last visited June 9, 2016).
2. See generally Eric Fisher, StubHub Becomes Sponsor of UNC Athletics, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Nov.
1, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2010/11/01/stubhub-becomes-sponsor-of-uncathletics.html.
3. See Patrick Vint, Ranking the NCAA's 5 Biggest Legal Battles, from Least to Most Threatening,

LOVE COMMENT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

826

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/15/2016 8:45 AM

[Vol. 26:2

in today’s business of intercollegiate athletics centers around possible violations
of antitrust law by the NCAA, as many student-athletes feel that they are being
exploited for their talents and not receiving a rightful share of profits.4
Additionally, former Northwestern football player Kain Colter and other
Wildcat football players, under the guise of the College Athletes Players
Association, raised one of the most significant and recently litigated issues
affecting intercollegiate student-athletes.5 In addition to the apparent
implications of labor and employment law, the question of student-athlete
recognition as university employees also strikes at the foundation of free speech
rights granted by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The advent and widespread popularity of social media applications such as
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr have drastically revolutionized the
communication process in the twenty-first century. The sweeping advantages
of social media have been accompanied by a host of First Amendment
implications and other potential free speech illegalities. The free speech
concerns associated with the regulation of student-athlete social media use
permeate throughout almost every facet of today’s society, including the
academic institution of intercollegiate athletics. It has been strongly implied,
through case law and public policy, that intercollegiate student-athletes enjoy a
substantially diminished right to free speech, which extends to the relatively
new communication platforms of social media.6 Although the bulk of case law
precedent involving a student’s diminished right to free speech focuses on the
claims of high school students, the courts’ reasoning in these cases indicates that
similar standards apply to intercollegiate student-athletes because of their status
as “student” athletes.7 Yet, despite the National Labor Relation Board’s
(NLRB) unfavorable decision in the Northwestern unionization case applying

SBNATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/3/20/5528032/ncaa-lawsuits-obannon-kessler-union.
4. See Associated Press, NCAA Files Appeal of O'Bannon Ruling, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11387865/ncaa-files-intent-appeal-obannon-decision;
see also Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaa-amateur-model; Associated Press, Shawne Alston Suing NCAA, Others, ESPN (Mar. 5,
2014), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10558893/ncaa-conferences-sued-scholarshipvalue.
5. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-playerstrying-join-labor-union.
6. See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
7. See id. at 587–601.
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Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the First Amendment
may afford employed student-athletes a higher degree of protection against
university regulation of social media use.8 In the absence of relief for
student-athletes seeking employee status under the NLRA, one can certainly
foresee the enactment of state-adopted legislation recognizing student-athletes
at public universities as employees.
This Comment will analyze the application of First Amendment free speech
rights to the regulation of intercollegiate student-athlete social media use by
public universities, if student-athletes were granted employee status under state
laws. Part II provides an abbreviated historical analysis of the free speech rights
granted to student-athletes under the First Amendment and examines how
colleges currently apply these rights with respect to social media as a form of
free speech. Part III provides a comprehensive look into recent changes in
intercollegiate athletics—with an emphasis on the Northwestern decision—that
have the potential to limit university rules such as the regulation of social media
use by student-athletes. Part IV discusses the regulation of social media use of
public-sector employees, and given the influence of the Northwestern
unionization case on the conferral of employee status to student-athletes, how
the institution of more favorable state labor laws would apply to student-athletes
attending public universities. Finally, Part V addresses whether the conferral of
employee status will affect the degree of social media regulation that a public
university can impart upon an employed student-athlete.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF STUDENT-ATHLETE FREE
SPEECH
The legal issues surrounding the right to speak freely, as established by the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, have permeated throughout every
facet of society since the ratification in 1791.9 As many student-athletes have
experienced, the world of intercollegiate athletics is not immune to the
oftentimes bizarre disputes arising from this grey area of the law. The beacon
of light that has shakily guided student-athletes through the haze of free speech
limitations originates from the exercise of the freedom of expression by high
school students.10 In the twenty-first century, advances in social media have

8. See generally Office of Pub. Affairs, Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in
Northwestern Case, NLRB (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/boardunanimously-decides-decline-jurisdiction-northwestern-case.
9. About the First Amendment, FIRST AMEND. CTR., http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/aboutthe-first-amendment (last visited June 9, 2016).
10. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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further complicated the freedoms of speech and expression for student-athletes.
A. Constitutional Origins of Student-Athlete Free Speech Regulation
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”11 Also contained
within the First Amendment’s free speech clause is the freedom of expression,
which affords every individual the right to express opinions without
governmental hindrance and to seek, receive, and communicate information and
ideas through any media source, regardless of boundaries.12 The tenets of the
First Amendment free speech and expression clauses extend to every member
of the public, including student-athletes enrolled in public high schools,
colleges, and universities. In fact, the seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District established the extent of power that a
public institution holds over the regulation of free speech and expression
exhibited by students.13
In Tinker, two public high school students and one junior high student wore
black armbands to school in opposition of the United States’ involvement in the
Vietnam War.14 School officials warned the students that wearing the
armbands, and refusing to remove them, would prompt suspension until the
students returned without the armbands.15 The district court and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for the school board, reasoning that the
school board’s actions were constitutional and reasonable to prevent disturbance
of school discipline.16 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and ruled
for the students.17 The Supreme Court determined that the students’ act of
wearing black armbands was more akin to pure speech protected by the First
Amendment and did not present a “substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities.”18 For over forty-six years, the Supreme
Court’s adoption of the “substantial disruption or material interference”
standard established in Tinker has defined the free speech limitations placed not

11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See id.; see also Freedom of Expression, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/issues/freedom-expression#.VQXSyhFFDmI (last visited June 9, 2016).
13. See generally 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
14. Id. at 504.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 504–05.
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id. at 513–14.
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only on public high school students, but intercollegiate student-athletes as
well.19
B. Current University Regulation of Student-Athlete Free Speech Rights with
Respect to Social Media
Moving into the modern-day realms of social media and intercollegiate
athletics, the regulation of free speech rights has become complex and
ambiguous. Although the foundational rule of substantial disruption or material
interference, as established in Tinker, still applies, the novelty of social media
and the non-custodial relationship between university officials and
intercollegiate student-athletes has muddied the application of the Tinker
standard.
Currently, the NCAA does not have a policy, bylaw, or recommendation
mandating that member-schools monitor student-athletes’ social media use.20
Instead, the NCAA has left this decision up to the discretion of its
member-institutions.21 Although the demarcation of social media regulation
can very likely blur into the violation of a student-athlete’s free speech rights,
many private and public universities have elected not to ignore the issue due to
the considerable risks associated with inappropriate social media use by
student-athletes.22 For example, in the controversial investigation involving the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) during the summer of 2011,
the NCAA Enforcement Staff had reportedly been made aware of various
violations by UNC’s football program through tweets found on two UNC
football players’ Twitter accounts.23 The role that social media played in the
heavy penalties imposed upon the UNC football program demonstrates the
utility of student-athlete social media regulation by university officials.24
In August 2010, UNC adopted an express policy addressing student-athlete
social networking and media use.25 The policy calls for each sporting team to

19. See generally id.; see also Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2007).
20. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Social Networks Pose Monitoring Challenge for NCAA Schools,
NCAA.ORG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2013/february/social%2Bnetworks%2Bpose%2Bmonitoring%2Bchallenge%2Bfor%2Bncaa%2Bschoolsdf30.html.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Jerry R. Parkinson, The Impact of Social Media on NCAA Infractions Cases, 1 MISS. SPORTS L.
REV. 37, 46–47 (2012).
24. See id.
25. THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, DEP'T ATHLETICS, POLICY ON STUDENT-ATHLETE
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND MEDIA USE (Apr. 2012), http://studentathletes.web.unc.
edu/files/2012/07/Social-Networking-Policy-updated.pdf.
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“identify at least one coach or administrator who is responsible for having
access to, regularly monitoring the content of, and/or receiving reports about
team members’ social networking sites and postings,” also referred to as a
“Team Monitor.”26 The policy permits UNC’s Department of Athletics to
contract with an outside vendor to serve as the Team Monitor.27 As stated
within the policy, UNC’s Department of Athletics does not mandate
student-athletes to provide their social media passwords to the Team Monitor,
and the Team Monitor may not independently access the student-athlete’s social
media account.28 Furthermore, the policy subjects student-athletes to internal
sanctions for a violation of the policy which “may include, but not be limited
to, notice to remove the posting or photo, dismissal from the team, and/or
reduction, cancellation, or non-renewal of athletics grant-in-aid.”29
UNC’s social media policy is an example of a public university’s active
stance with respect to the regulation of student-athlete social media use.
Although the policy makes no mention of internal sanctions imposed upon a
student-athlete for “substantially disrupting or materially interfering with”
school activities, the language of the policy guidelines does leave some room
for ambiguity concerning what constitutes “[d]erogatory or defamatory
language” within the context of “disrespectful comments and behavior
online.”30 Thus, UNC’s social media policy contains just enough wiggle room
for university officials to combat a student-athlete’s potential allegation of free
speech infringement.
Another example of a public university’s regulatory methods with respect
to student-athletes’ social media use is the University of California at Los
Angeles’ (UCLA) Code of Conduct.31 Unlike UNC’s stand-alone social media
policy, UCLA’s social media guidelines are contained within the UCLA
student-athlete handbook.32 Similar to UNC’s policy, UCLA’s Code of
Conduct warns student-athletes about the risks associated with social media and
provides student-athletes with specific instructions on what not to post to social

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. UCLA DEP’T INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 2015–16 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK & DAY
PLANNER 16–17 (2015–16), http://www.uclabruins.com/fls/30500/pdf/SA-Handbook.pdf?DB_
OEM_ID=30500.
32. See id.
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media websites.33 One of the most ambiguous limitations found within the
Code of Conduct that arguably falls within the grey area of free speech states
that student-athletes cannot post “[d]erogatory or defamatory language about
anyone, including coaches, officials, opponents, UCLA Athletics, UCLA, the
Pac-12 or the NCAA.”34 Further, referring explicitly to the athletic
department’s process of monitoring, the Code of Conduct states, “Coaches,
Athletic Department administrators, the NCAA, faculty, staff, residential life,
employers, alumni, the media and the UCLA Police Department can and do
review these websites.”35 Finally, similar to the UNC policy, the UCLA Code
of Conduct states that social media postings associated with a student-athlete’s
profile can lead to “suspension or expulsion, with the reduction or cancellation
of financial aid” if found to violate the Code of Conduct.36
UNC’s social media policy and UCLA’s Code of Conduct both exemplify
the high level of attention that social media has garnered in the intercollegiate
athletics context. The general methods of monitoring utilized by UNC and
UCLA’s athletic departments appear to be in accordance with the expected
course of supervision undertaken by most colleges and universities. The
potential free speech encroachments that lie within the UNC and UCLA social
media guidelines stem from the vagueness associated with derogatory and
defamatory language. If classified as university employees, it is likely that
student-athletes would be able to speak more freely on social media sites
regarding issues of public concern, even if the student-athlete’s opinion is in
opposition to their university–employer. How would student-athletes achieve
such a level of increased autonomy? The first step would be the acquisition of
federal and state employee status.
III. RECENT CHANGES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS WITH THE POTENTIAL
TO LIMIT UNIVERSITY RULES CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF
STUDENT-ATHLETE FREE SPEECH
Recently, a number of legal claims brought by student-athletes and other
interested parties involving possible violations of federal antitrust and labor
laws have plagued the NCAA and its member-schools. These legal claims strike
at the very heart of amateurism, the core principle that the NCAA clings to in
defense of its current governance and structure.37 From a linear perspective, if

33. Id.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. (emphasis omitted).
36. Id. at 17.
37. J. Freedley Hunsicker Jr., A Significant Attack on the NCAA's Principle of Amateurism, LEGAL
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the NCAA is subject to antitrust and labor laws, public and private institutions
that hold membership in the NCAA may also be individually subject to antitrust
and labor laws.
The NCAA’s litigation portfolio currently consists of a voluminous number
of antitrust cases brought by student-athletes, as well as other interested
parties.38 These cases include claims that the NCAA and EA Sports have
improperly used the likenesses of student-athletes in video games without
sharing the profits39 and allegations that the NCAA conferences and
member-schools have unlawfully fixed prices to limit the amount of scholarship
money a student-athlete can be awarded.40
In addition to the aforementioned antitrust claims affecting the future of
intercollegiate athletics, one of the most significant labor law claims recently
examined involved the Northwestern Wildcats football program and the
players’ rally to unionize as statutory employees under the NLRA.41 The
decision of the Region 13 NLRB, in which the Regional Director found that
Northwestern football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships should be
considered employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA, had the potential to
drastically alter several defining aspects of the relationship between
student-athletes and the universities that they attend, including the regulation of
student-athlete social media use.42 In the initial case, Northwestern failed to
prove that grant-in-aid scholarship football players should have been excluded
from consideration as employees under the NLRA.43 Instead, the Regional

INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2014 (archived on LexisAdvance).
38. See Vint, supra note 3.
39. Steve Berkowitz, Judge Releases Ruling on O'Bannon Case: NCAA Loses, USA TODAY (Aug.
8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/08/ed-obannon-antitrust-lawsuit-vsncaa/13801277/. The O’Bannon ruling in favor of the class-action plaintiffs is currently on appeal by
the NCAA. See generally Jon Solomon, NCAA Relies Heavily on Supreme Court Case to Appeal
Paying Players, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jonsolomon/24810277/ncaa-relies-heavily-on-supreme-court-case-to-appeal-paying-players.
40. Zac Ellis, What Does the Kessler Antitrust Lawsuit vs. the NCAA Mean? Michael McCann
Explains, SI (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/campus-union/2014/03/17/ncaa-antitrust-lawsuit-jeffrey-kessler. It should be noted that the NCAA’s “Big Five” Conferences (ACC, SEC,
Big Ten, Big 12, and Pac-12) recently passed autonomous legislation that allows colleges and
universities to cover the full cost of attendance for scholarship student-athletes. See Mitch Sherman,
Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79–1, ESPN (Jan. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-pass-cost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins.
41. Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
42. Id. at 1 n.1.
43. Id. at 13.
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Director found that Northwestern’s scholarship football players were employees
under the NLRA for six primary reasons: (1) scholarship football players
perform services for the benefit of the employer (university) for which they
receive compensation, not financial aid; (2) scholarship football players are
subject to the university’s control in the performance of their duties as football
players; (3) scholarship football players are not primarily students, but rather
athletes; (4) the athletic responsibilities of scholarship football players do not
constitute a central element of their educational degree requirements; (5) the
athletic duties of scholarship football players are not supervised by academic
faculty; and (6) scholarship football players are not temporary employees as
defined by the NLRA.44
Although the decision of the Regional Director was appealed and later
dismissed in favor of the NCAA and Northwestern by the NLRB,45 the case
brought national attention to an issue that the NCAA and its member-institutions
will likely be forced to revisit: under what circumstances could student-athletes
be deemed employees. The underlying tenets of the Northwestern University
unionization case support the assertion that if student-athletes were able to
acquire recognition as university employees under applicable state laws,
regulation of their social media use by university officials would likely
implicate a heightened degree of free speech rights.46 However, as a federal
statute, the NLRA applies only to employers within the private sector.47 As the
language suggests, “Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act . . . to
curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm
the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”48 Thus, for
student-athletes at public universities to receive recognition as employees,
despite the shortcomings of their private school counterparts, the interpretation
of employees under state labor laws would need to include intercollegiate
student-athletes.49

44. Id. at 14–21.
45. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html?_r=0.
46. See generally Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69
U. MIAMI L. REV. 65 (2014) (analyzing whether college athletes should be considered employees).
47. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relationsact (last visited June 9, 2016).
48. Id.
49. See Frequently Asked Questions: Is My Employer Subject to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)?, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3208 (last visited June 9, 2016).
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IV. REGULATING FREE SPEECH OF PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYEES
The degree of autonomy with respect to an employee’s exercise of his or
her First Amendment free speech rights differs in scope and legal governance
depending on the setting in which the employee works. Employees are
classified as either private-sector or public-sector employees.50 This distinction
extends to the classification of employees who work for private or public
universities. Accordingly, if granted employee status, whether a student-athlete
attends a private or public university plays a major role in the extent to which
university officials would be permitted to regulate the employed
student-athlete’s social media use.
It is well-established that fundamental rights granted by the U.S.
Constitution, such as free speech, are substantially lessened, if at all applicable,
by the legitimate interests of private employers.51 As applied to the context of
private universities and the hypothetical of employed student-athletes, this lack
of constitutional deference permits private university officials and athletic
administrators to broadly define what constitutes disruptive speech and enforce
vague policies that disallow the expression of unpopular opinions that are not
favored by the university.52 For example, Northwestern University’s Athletic
Department (a division of a private university) employs an online social
networking policy that “educat[es] and protect[s]” student-athletes from the
dangers of posting information via social media that may constitute
inappropriate behavior, including posts addressing controversial topics or
opinions.53 In effect, the Northwestern Athletics’ social networking policy
subjects student-athletes to sanctions for failure to agree and adhere to a policy

50. Jared Lewis, What Is the Meaning of Public Sector Employment vs. Private?, CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/meaning-public-sector-employment-vs-private-32297.html
(last
visited June 9, 2016).
51. See Douglas E. Lee, NLRB Bolsters Private-Employee Speech, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 14,
2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/nlrb-bolsters-private-employee-speech; Martin BermanGorvine, Employer Ability To Silence Employee Speech Narrowing in Private Sector,
Attorneys Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 19, 2014), http://www.bna.com/employer-ability-silencen17179890580/.
52. See Harvey A. Silverglate, David French & Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech Rights on Private
College Campuses: Free Speech and the Private University, KNOW MY RTS., http://www.knowmyrights.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44:free-speech-rights-on-private-college-campuses&catid=18&Itemid=123 (last visited June 9, 2016).
53. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS 2015–2016 10 (2015), http://sidearm.sites.s3.amazonaws.com/nusports.com/documents/2015/10/19/2015_2016_Student_Athlete_Handbook.pdf?id=13625; see also id. at 11 (depicting the social media decision process that student-athletes
should adhere to as recommended by Northwestern Athletic Department).
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that has the contractual power to restrain the student-athletes’ free speech
rights.54
Despite the broad powers afforded to private employers with respect to the
regulation and limitation of employee free speech rights, the NLRA provides
private employees with a legally grounded means of protection against the
employers’ absolute regulation in this area.55 Under Section 7 of the NLRA,
private employees have the right to use free speech when engaging in concerted
activity for the mutual aid and protection of the collective unit.56 As such, if
student-athletes at Northwestern were to have been granted employee status,
they would have been able to utilize social media to discuss controversial topics
or opinions for the mutual aid and protection of the collective student-athlete
population under the security of the NLRA.57
The recent NLRB decision, which dismissed the petition for recognition as
statutory employees filed by football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships
at Northwestern University, implicates many privileges afforded to
student-athletes, including free speech rights.58 However, as mentioned earlier,
a decision in favor of the Wildcat football players would have applied only to
private universities and colleges.59 In the interest of equality and competitive
balance amongst student-athletes across the nation, it is highly plausible that
student-athletes attending public universities or colleges will seek to achieve
employee status as well. With the exception of Michigan, and likely Ohio, the
labor laws of many states do not expressly prohibit student-athletes from
acquiring recognition as public employees.60
Accordingly, many
student-athletes attending public universities around the nation could make a
strong case for state-based employee status based on the definition and
interpretation of the term “employee” as found within the states’ labor law
statutes.61

54. See id. at 10.
55. See Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or
One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711, 753–54 (1977).
56. Id. at 753; see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
58. See generally Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 8.
59. See National Labor Relations Act, supra note 47.
60. See Christian Dennie, Michigan Governor Signs Law Excluding Student-Athletes from the
Definition of Public Employee for the Purposes of Collective Bargaining, BARLOW GARSEK & SIMON,
LLP (Jan. 7, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.bgsfirm.com/college-sports-law-blog/michigan-governorsigns-law-excluding-student-athletes-from-the-definition-of-public-employee-for-the-purposes-ofcollective-bargaining; Sara Ganim, Some Ohio Lawmakers Don’t Want College Athletes Unionized,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/08/us/ohio-athletes-union-ban/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2014).
61. Jaime Miettinen, Could Michigan Be Starting a New Trend by Excluding Public University
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For instance, Section 810.2 of the California Government Code defines
employee as “an officer, judicial officer as defined in Section 327 of the
Elections Code, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not
include an independent contractor.”62 Section 811.4 of the Code further defines
a public employee as “an employee of a public entity.”63 Additionally, Section
811.2 of the Code defines a public entity as including “the state, the Regents of
the University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and
the California State University, a county, city, district, public authority, public
agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.”64
Because California’s definition of a public employee does not explicitly exclude
student-athletes at public universities from consideration, the student-athletes
could very well assert their status as employees given sufficient supporting
evidence.65
Illinois statutory law provides another example of state law under which
public university student-athletes could be considered public employees.
Chapter 5 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes defines a public employee or
employee as “any individual employed by a public employer.”66 The statute
further defines a public employer or employer as meaning “the State of
Illinois . . . authorities including departments, divisions, bureaus, boards,
commissions, or other agencies of the foregoing entities.”67 Similar to
California public-sector labor laws, student-athletes attending public
universities in Illinois could be considered public employees, should the
relevant statutory language be interpreted broadly.68
In light of the shifting atmosphere surrounding the idea of unionization for
intercollegiate student-athletes, at least one state legislature has entertained the
possibility of expressly allowing student-athletes to be deemed public
employees for collective bargaining purposes.69 House Bill 6783, which has

Student-Athletes from Being "Public Employees"?, SPORTS L. BLONDE (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.sportslawblondes.com/blog/2015/3/2/could-michigan-be-starting-a-new-trend-by-excluding-public-university-student-athletes-from-being-public-employees.
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 810.2 (2016).
63. Id. § 811.4.
64. Id. § 811.2.
65. See Miettinen, supra note 61.
66. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(n) (2016).
67. Id. 315/3(o).
68. See Miettinen, supra note 61.
69. See Daniela Altimari, Lawmakers Discuss Study Bill Allowing Student-Athletes to Join a Union,
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been introduced to the Connecticut legislature, and if passed, will authorize the
state’s labor commissioner to lead a study regarding the unionization of
intercollegiate student-athletes at public universities and colleges in
Connecticut.70 If the outcome of the commissioner’s unionization study were
to lead to the recognition of college student-athletes as public employees,
Connecticut could potentially spark a wave of legislation in favor of
student-athletes across the nation.
If established, the conferral of employee status to student-athletes attending
public universities would catapult the issue of necessary revisions to free speech
rights granted to these employed student-athletes, with an emphasis on the
ever-expanding realm of social media. Although the argument has been made
that the NLRA and First Amendment provide an almost identical degree of free
speech protection to private and public employees, the broader scope of free
speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment seems to provide public
employees with a more generous bundle of rights to levy against the employer.71
In contrast to private employers and free speech rights under the NLRA,
rules and policies instituted by public-sector employers that regulate the free
speech of public employees fall within the purview of the U.S. Constitution and
applicable state laws.72 The hallmark case of Pickering v. Board of Education,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968, sets out the standard by which a
public employer may regulate the free speech of its employees.73 In Pickering,
the defendant, the Board of Education, terminated the plaintiff, a public school
teacher, for sending a written letter to the local newspaper criticizing the Board
and superintendent’s management of a tax proposal intended to raise revenue
for the local schools.74 As a public employer, the Board’s actions against the
teacher for his opinion expressed within the letter fell within the scope of the
First Amendment’s free speech clause.75 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the Board of Education, reasoning that the teacher’s dismissal
was appropriate because his adverse opinion of the Board’s actions, as

HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.courant.com/politics/capitol-watch/hc-bill-in-connecticut-would-study-whether-to-allow-studentathletes-to-unionized-20150226-story.html.
70. Id.
71. See Lynd, supra note 55, at 711.
72. Christopher Raines, Private Sector vs. Public Sector Employee Rights, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/private-sector-vs-public-sector-employee-rights-47957.html (last visited June 9,
2016).
73. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
74. Id. at 564.
75. See id. at 573.
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expressed within the letter, were injurious to the interests of the school system.76
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and held
that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”77 Thus, Pickering
stands for the proposition that a public employee may exercise his free speech
rights when opining on issues of public concern, as long as the speech does not
injure the employer’s business or hinder the efficiency of its operations.78
Because social media has transformed the means by which private and public
sector employees communicate, the legal principle of Pickering must now be
applied to employee speech taking the form of Twitter tweets, blog posts, and
Facebook comments.79
Pickering addresses one of the most common methods of regulation that an
employee may be subjected to by his or her employer with respect to free
speech: simply “monitoring” the employee’s expressions and opinions voiced
through writing, tweets, online posts, and comments. Other public and private
employers have gone so far as to mandate that employees relinquish their
usernames and passwords to social media networks, emails, and the like.80 This
more intrusive approach to social media regulation has prompted many states to
adopt legislation expressly forbidding employers from asking employees to turn
over their social media usernames and passwords.81 Currently, twenty-two
states have either introduced or considered legislation that would prevent an
employer from acquiring the username or passwords of employees.82 A minute
number of states have also enacted legislation that entirely prohibits academic
institutions from requesting or mandating a student to divulge his or her social
media usernames or passwords.83

76. Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 574.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Associated Press, Employers Ask for Facebook Password, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/empoyers-ask-for-facebook-password-2012-3.
81. Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx.
82. Id.
83. Employer Access to Social Media Passwords: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx.
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The following laws, enacted by the California’s legislature, illustrate
examples of state legislation that completely prohibits an employer from
intruding upon an employee or student’s free speech rights through the invasion
of social media accounts. Assembly Bill 1844 applies to employers as follows:
Prohibit[s] an employer from requiring or requesting an
employee or applicant for employment to disclose a username
or password for the purpose of accessing personal social media,
to access personal social media in the presence of the employer,
or to divulge any personal social media. . . . [P]rohibits an
employer from discharging, disciplining, threatening to
discharge or discipline, or otherwise retaliating against an
employee or applicant for not complying with a request or
demand by the [violating] employer . . . .84
Senate Bill 1349 includes language regarding social media policies for
postsecondary institutions:
[P]rohibit[s] public and private postsecondary educational
institutions, and their employees and representatives, from
requiring or requesting a student, prospective student, or
student
group
to
disclose . . . personal
social
media . . . information . . . . [P]rohibit[s such] institution[s]
from threatening . . . or taking [certain] actions for refus[al of
a] demand [for such information] . . . .85
The Senate Bill also requires these institutions to ensure compliance with
these provisions and to post their social media privacy policies on their web
sites.86
The enactment of these state laws governing social media regulation
indicates that even without the conferral of employee status to intercollegiate
student-athletes, states are gradually beginning to take progressive measures to
protect the free speech rights of both public employees and students.87 The
Pickering “matter of public concern” test, which governs the limitations that an

84. Assemb. B. 1844, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
85. S.B. 1349, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
86. Id.
87. See Employer Access to Social Media Passwords: 2012 Legislation, supra note 83.
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employer may place on a public employee’s free speech rights, and
state-specific legislation governing student and employee rights to withhold
social media usernames and passwords both demonstrate the current legal
atmosphere surrounding the First Amendment in the public sector.
V. REGULATING FREE SPEECH, VIA SOCIAL MEDIA, OF EMPLOYED
STUDENT-ATHLETES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
In the quest for answers concerning how the conferral of employee status
would alter public university regulation of employed student-athletes with
respect to free speech rights, the following suppositions have been
contemplated: (1) student-athletes at public universities may be more likely to
seek employee status under state laws in the wake of the national attention
advanced by the NLRB’s decision to dismiss the unionization efforts put forth
by Northwestern football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships, and (2) in
the absence of express state-law language stating otherwise,88 student-athletes
at public universities could organize and lobby to be recognized as public
employees. Despite the existence of the possibility of employee status for
student-athletes attending public universities, the probability that these
student-athletes will actually be deemed employees depends largely on two
factors: (1) whether the state in which the public university or college is located
has expressly prohibited, by law, student-athletes from consideration as public
employees, and (2) whether the applicable labor laws of the state support an
interpretation that enables student-athletes to be considered as public
employees.89 Thus, it follows that not every scholarship athlete attending a
public university will be eligible for employee status.
If student-athletes at public universities do acquire employee status, the
legal standard used to determine the degree of protection afforded to the
student-athlete’s free speech would present a complex question. Should courts
apply the substantial disruption or material interference with school activities
standard from Tinker, or the matters of public concern standard enumerated by
the court in Pickering?90 Snyder v. Millersville University provides persuasive
insight as to how the free speech rights of publicly employed student-athletes

88. See generally Dennie, supra note 60.
89. See generally Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees and Should Be
Allowed to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014
/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/.
90. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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would be assessed.91 Although Snyder was decided by the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the reasoning of the court with respect
to the free speech standard that should govern student employees at public
institutions is sound.92
In Snyder, the plaintiff was a participant in the Student Teaching Program
of Millersville University.93 As a requirement for the successful completion of
the program, the plaintiff served as a student-teacher in English at a local high
school.94 During her tenure as a student-teacher at the high school, the plaintiff
posted a disrespectful and inappropriate MySpace message inviting her students
to befriend her on the social network, and allegedly referred to her teaching
program superiors as “problems.”95 A photo of the plaintiff wearing a pirate
hat and holding an alcoholic beverage accompanied the post.96 The district
court determined that the plaintiff’s MySpace post triggered the Pickering
matter of public concern standard because the plaintiff made the post with
respect to and during the practice of her role as a teacher and not as a student in
the traditional sense.97 Thus, the court’s decision of the applicable standard in
Snyder indicates that the free speech of student-athletes who are also public
employees will be afforded protection under the First Amendment when the
speech concerns public matters.98
The plaintiff’s social media post in Snyder concerned a personal matter as
opposed to a matter of public concern;99 however, there may very well be other
circumstances where an employed student-athlete’s social media speech would
trigger a Pickering standard. For example, consider if the athletic department
of a public university adopted a social media policy similar to the UCLA Code
of Conduct under which student-athletes are not allowed to post “[d]erogatory
or defamatory language about anyone, including coaches, officials, opponents,
[University] Athletics, [the University], the [Conference] or the NCAA.”100
Now consider if the university’s athletic department experiences an unfortunate
scenario in which a coach is found to have committed acts of domestic violence
against his spouse and children. Should an employed student-athlete under the

91. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
92. See id.
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id. at *2–3.
95. Id. at *5.
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id. at *14–15.
98. Id. at *16.
99. Id.
100. See UCLA DEP’T INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 31, at 16.
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coach’s tutelage decide to make a Facebook post expressing his fervent
disappointment and aversion for the coach’s actions, the argument could be
made that the athlete’s speech constitutes a matter of public concern.101
Although the student-athlete’s social media post could reasonably be seen as
substantially disruptive and to materially interfere with the activities of the
athletic department under the Tinker standard,102 his speech would likely be
protected under the First Amendment because of his standing as a public
employee.
The hypothetical explained above may seem like a stretch of the
imagination to some, but with the shifting climate of intercollegiate athletics,
the conferral of employee status to student-athletes at public universities grows
more plausible. If student-athletes were to be recognized as public employees,
the oppressive Tinker standard would no longer mute their freedoms of speech
and expression. Employed student-athletes would have greater liberty to openly
discuss matters of public concern that may present views in opposition of the
university or athletic department. As the wave of social media continues to
expand, employed student-athletes would have a number of social media
channels to voice their opinions when appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, no uniform guidance exists that mandates the regulation of
college athletes’ social media use by university officials. However, with the
potential negative impact that speech voiced through social media outlets can
have on a university’s image, some university athletic departments have
unilaterally enacted social media policies to monitor the speech of
student-athletes.103 Despite having the autonomy to enact customized social
media policies aimed at policing student-athlete tweets, comments, and posts,
public university officials must still adhere to the parameters of the First

101. See Sandra Horley, Opinion: Why Domestic Violence Is Never a Private Issue, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/19/opinion/opinion-domestic-violence-not-private-issue/ (last updated
June 19, 2013).
102. The employed student-athlete’s post may substantially disrupt or materially interfere with the
activities of the athletic department if other student-athletes or athletic officials decided to voice their
opinions, decided not to play for the coach, or decided to transfer to another institution as a direct result
of the student-athlete’s initial Facebook post.
103. Rex Santus, Social Media Monitoring Widespread Among College Athletic Departments, Public Records Survey Shows, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.splc.org/article/2014/03/social-media-monitoring-widespread-among-college-athletic-departments-public-records-survey-shows.
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Amendment free speech clause. If college athletes were to attain employee
status under applicable state laws, the extent of their First Amendment free
speech rights would be reasonably expanded.
In a public university setting, employed student-athletes would possess
more freedom to express their views using social media, even if the
student-athlete’s opinion is not supported by the university or its officials, as
long as the athlete’s speech pertains to a matter of public concern. Under the
Pickering public concern standard, instead of being subjected to almost
automatic regulation of their social media messages, the context of an employed
student-athlete’s social media use would be balanced against the legitimate
objectives of the public university.104 Although employed student-athletes
would enjoy more formidable free speech rights with respect to social media
use as a result of a the public employer-employee status, the university would
still possess authority to regulate the student-athlete’s social media content.

104. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.

